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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20010970-CA

ROBIN LA FOND,
Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of illegal
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second
degree felony.

This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the

case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1996) .
STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the officer exceed the scope of the traffic stop

when, after assessing the totality of the circumstances, he
inquired whether the occupants had any alcohol or marijuana in
the vehicle?
2.

Was the officer justified in conducting a limited

protective frisk where defendant was behaving in a "very evasive"
and "very nervous" manner and where, despite bulky clothing, she
had an obvious "bulge" in her right front pocket?
"The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to

grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under
the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal
standard to the facts."

State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247

(Utah App. 1956) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
The Utah statute granting peace officers the authority to
frisk suspects for dangerous weapons states:
A peace officer who has stopped a person
temporarily for questioning may frisk the
person for a dangerous weapon if he
reasonably believes he or any other person is
in danger.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second degree felony,
and one count of possession of paraphernalia, a class B
2

misdemeanor (R. 1-2). After a preliminary hearing, she was bound
over to district court, where she filed a motion to suppress (R.
15, 17). The district court denied the motion, and defendant
filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which this Court
denied (R. 26-28, 89). Defendant then entered a guilty plea to
the second degree felony, reserving the right to appeal from the
adverse ruling on the suppression motion (R. 91-98).

The trial

court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison (R. 112-14).

This timely appeal followed (R. 115).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the night of March 23, 2001, while patrolling on 1-70,
Officer Salis of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped a vehicle in
which defendant was the sole passenger for speeding and a missing
license plate light (R. 127 at 5).

The officer asked the driver

for his license, registration, and proof of insurance (Id. at 6).
The driver responded that he did not have a license and that the
vehicle belonged to defendant.

The driver also explained that

his license had been suspended for driving under the influence
and that he was eligible to reapply but had not yet done so
(Id.).

Defendant, sitting in the passenger seat, then

interjected an apology, stating that she should have been
driving, but that she was tired (Id.).
At about this time, Officer Salis noticed a purple Crown
Royal bag with something in it on the front seat between the

3

driver and passenger (Id. at 6, 18) .
Officer Salis explained that he had stopped the vehicle
because it was speeding and also because he noticed that a front
license plate light was out.

He then asked defendant for her

vehicle registration (Id. at 6). According to the officer, prior
to looking in the glove box for the requested document, defendant
"was looking on the front seat and looking on the floorboard.
She then grabbed a brown leather-like, a small coin purse or
cigarette purse and placed it on the seat in between her legs"
(Id. at 7).

The officer characterized her movement "as if she

was concealing it" (Id. at 18).
As defendant was searching for the vehicle registration, the
officer shone his flashlight towards the glove box.

He observed,

"[T]his whole time, [defendant] was moving very fast, and she was
going over the glove box and coming out of the glove box and
appeared very nervous" (Id. at 7).

He described her as "more

nervous than others" (Id. at 17). In the light from the
flashlight, the officer noticed that "directly below the ashtray
on the floor of the vehicle was like a console and there was a
cup holder that was there, and I could see real small green
particles inside this cup holder" (Id.).

Based on his past

experience, Officer Salis believed the particles to be marijuana

(IdJ .
Defendant located the vehicle registration, gave it to the

4

officer, and continued searching quickly and nervously for proof
of insurance (Id. at 7). While defendant was looking, Officer
Salis asked both occupants if they had anything illegal in the
vehicle, including weapons, alcohol, or marijuana (Id. at 8).
Defendant responded that they did not (Id.).

The officer then

inquired "if, to her knowledge, anyone had smoked marijuana in
the vehicle recently7' (Id.) . Responding that she did not think
so, but was not entirely sure, defendant explained that a friend
had borrowed the car for a week and that she had just picked it
up that morning.

The officer then asked if he could search the

vehicle for the items about which he had inquired.

She consented

(Id^) .
Officer Salis explained that he would like both defendant
and then the driver to exit the vehicle in turn. As defendant
got out of the car, she took "some type of bag" off the seat, as
well as "a pack of cigarettes and the brown leather bag that was
on the seat in between her legs" (Id. at 8). Approaching the
front of the vehicle, defendant put both hands in her pockets.
Officer Salis described what happened next:
I then asked her what she had placed in her
pockets. She stated she did not place
anything in her pockets. I then asked her to
remove the bag that she had placed in her
pocket. At that time, she reached into her
left front pocket of her pants she was
wearing and pulled out the brown leather
purse that she had and had placed it on the
hood of the car [sic]. At this time I could,
also, see that the right front pocket was
5

bulging as well. I asked her to remove the
other bag from that pocket. At that time,
she stated that she didn't not [sic] have
anything in the pocket, and she then turned
and faced away from me. As she faced away
from me, she put her right hand in her right
front pocket. At this time I was trying to
approach her to reach towards the pocket when
she actually pulled this little - it was a
black kind of a leather coin purse out of the
pocket and dropped it on the ground. As I
saw it drop to the ground, I asked her - I
immediately picked it up and asked her what
it was. She stated that she does leather
work, and that's all she stated. At this
point she was still being very evasive. She
did not want me to get close to that pocket.
I explained that I needed her to just stand
still, face away from me. She finally
stopped and held still for a minute. At that
point I was padding [sic] down the exterior
of that right front pocket. And while doing
so, I felt what I believed was a pipe in that
right front pocket. I asked the female if
she would remove that object from her pocket,
which she would not. At that time, I then
went into the pocket and I pulled out of the
pocket was [sic] a - a small pocket torch.
There was also a glass pipe and then a small
glass jar which contained suspected
methamphetamine.
(Id. at 9-10).
When asked specifically why he chose to pat down defendant,
Officer Salis responded that defendant was wearing a bulky layer
of clothing over another layer, her pockets were "bulging," she
was "very nervous and very evasive, doesn't want to come into
contact with me," and that he "wanted to first make sure there
was no weapons" (Id. at 19-20).

He also noted that "it's

possible that she was, also, removing contraband" (Id.).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The officer who stopped the vehicle in which defendant was a
passenger did not unreasonably expand the scope of the traffic
stop by asking questions about the contents of the car.

Under

the totality of the circumstances, the officer's suspicion of
criminal activity was supported by the following articulable
facts.

The officer testified that he observed a Crown Royal bag

with something in it on the front seat of the car, in close
proximity to the driver, who told him that his license had been
suspended for driving under the influence of alcohol. The
officer also observed the passenger grab a small bag and secret
it between her legs.

He further observed a cup containing small

green particles that he believed were marijuana.

Finally, he

noted defendant's unusually nervous and speedy behavior as she
responded to his request for documentation.

Based on all of

these observations, asking questions about the presence of drugs
or alcohol was the least intrusive, most efficient method of
confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicion of criminal
activity.

The trial court's ruling that the officer properly

expanded the scope of the stop should, therefore, be affirmed.
The officer also properly frisked defendant once she was out
of the car.

Contrary to defendant's assertion that she was

searched rather than frisked, the facts all point to a frisk.
Where defendant's pocket was bulging, where she was acting

7

evasively, and where the officer carefully confined the scope of
his action to a limited patdown designed to discover the
potentially dangerous contents of the single bulging pocket, the
trial court properly characterized the officer's action as a
frisk.

The frisk was proper because it was based on specific and

articulable facts that explained why the officer thought
defendant might pose a danger to him.

And once the officer

frisked defendant and felt a pipe in her pocket, he was justified
in removing it pursuant to the plain feel doctrine, a corollary
of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
Because the trial court properly denied defendant's motion
to suppress, this Court should affirm her conviction for
possession or use of a controlled substance, a second degree
felony.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
OFFICER SALIS DID NOT EXCEED THE
SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WHEN,
AFTER ASSESSING THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, HE INQUIRED WHETHER
THE OCCUPANTS HAD ANY ALCOHOL OR
MARIJUANA IN THE VEHICLE
Defendant argues that the officer who stopped her car for
speeding and a missing license plate light improperly exceeded
the scope of that traffic stop when he asked her "questions about
the contents of the car" (Br. of App. at 12). Specifically, he
contends that "the trooper had no basis for asking if there was
8

anything illegal, if there were weapons or alcohol or marijuana
in the car, or if anyone had smoked marijuana in the car
recently" (Id^ at 12-13)-1
The law is well-settled that when an officer stops a
vehicle, the resulting detention "must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).

Any investigative

questioning that detains the driver beyond the original purposes
of the stop "must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more
serious criminal activity" and must be "based on specific,
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances
facing the officer at the time of the stop."

State v, Lopez, 873

P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted).
Reasonable suspicion exists if, from the facts and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, an officer would
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).

Terry v.

A confluence of factors, then,

rather than any individual circumstance, will render an officer's

1

Defendant sought suppression only of drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Thus, even had the officer's inquiry about
weapons constituted error, the error could only be harmless. The
inquiry, however, appears to be a permissible one. See United
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (10th Cir.
2 001)(concluding that to permit officers to inquire about the
presence of weapons during a proper vehicle stop, even in the
absence of particularized suspicion of personal danger, "will
promote the government's 'legitimate and weighty' interest in
officer safety").
9

experienced suspicion of criminal activity reasonable.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990).

State v.

Thus, a reviewing

court examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding each
case to determine whether specific and articulable facts exist to
meet this standard.

See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah

App. 1994); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
Here, the evidence before the trial court as well as the
reasonable inferences that the court drew from that evidence
support the officer's reasonable suspicion that the occupants of
the vehicle may have been involved in criminal activity.

Asking

them further questions constituted the most expeditious means of
resolving his concerns.

See State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136

(Utah App. 1991)(an officer with reasonable suspicion must
"diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to
confirm or dispel [the officer's] suspicions quickly, during
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant")(citation
omitted).
Early in the traffic stop, when the driver failed to produce
a license, Officer Salis learned that the license issued to the
driver had been suspended and that he had a history of driving
under the influence of alcohol (R. 127 at 6). Shortly
thereafter, the officer noticed a Crown Royal bag with something
in it on the front seat between the driver and passenger (Id. at
6, 18). The confluence of these factors, a bag normally used to
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contain a bottle of alcohol observed in close proximity to a
vehicle operator whose license had previously been suspended for
driving under the influence, underscores the reasonableness of
some further inquiry into the presence alcohol in the vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, the officer saw defendant grab a small
purse and put it on the seat between her legs, a gesture that
implied to him that she was hiding something (Id. at 7, 18).
Further, after the officer asked for the vehicle registration and
defendant began searching for it, the officer noticed a cup in a
console under the ashtray, containing "real small green
particles" that he believed were marijuana (Id. at 7) .2
Defendant's unusual demeanor - her more than normal nervousness
and the speedy nature of her physical movements - served as an
overlay to all of the officer's articulated observations,
underscoring the reasonableness of his decision to inquire
further about the presence of drugs.
To follow up quickly on all of his observations and to
confirm or dispel his suspicions about possible alcohol or drugs
in the vehicle, the officer reasonably inquired whether the
subjects had anything illegal in the vehicle.

When they

responded that they did not, the officer specifically asked about
weapons, alcohol, or marijuana (Id. at 8). That question also

2

Because the quantity of the suspected marijuana was so
small, the officer neither tested it nor considered charging the
occupants with possession of marijuana (R. 127 at 15-16).
11

elicited a negative response.

Still looking to confirm or dispel

his suspicion about the green particles he had observed and
seeking as well an explanation that would be consistent with
defendant's denial, the officer next asked defendant "if, to her
knowledge, anyone had smoked marijuana in the vehicle recently"
(Id.).

Defendant responded "she did not think so, but she was

not sure. She said she had lent the car to a male friend of hers,
and he had borrowed the car for approximately a week, and she had
just picked the car up that morning" (Id.).
Explaining why he expanded the scope of the traffic stop by
asking the questions to which defendant objects, the officer
testified:
Well, first of all, just the demeanor of the
female subject. She was - while I was
talking to the subject, she was moving very
fast. She appeared to be very nervous, more
nervous than others. She kept looking on the
seat and down on the floor. She picked up a
brown leather purse and placed it on the seat
in between her legs, as if she was concealing
it. There was a Crown Royal bag, which was
on the seat, which had something in it, which
I did not know if it was a Crown Royal bottle
or what was inside of it. The driver was
holding a large refill cup and his license
was, also, suspended for a previous DUI.
While looking or shining my flashlight in
that direction, I saw what appeared could
possibly [sic] be marijuana. . . Based on all
that, I felt I had an obligation to
investigate further.
(Id. at 17-18).
Under these specific circumstances, the trial court properly

12

determined that "the officer had a reasonable basis for
suspecting that something was amiss, sufficient to justify the
officer's further inquiry" (R. 27 at addendum A). 3

Indeed, not

only was the officer justified, but also he had a duty to make
further inquiries.

State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah

1980)(when reasonable suspicion exists, an officer "has not only
the right but the duty to make observations and investigations to
determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take
such measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the
law")(citation omitted).
Because the officer articulated the facts upon which he
based his questioning and because those facts considered as a

3

The trial court based this ruling on six relevant
findings. See R. 27 at addendum A. Defendant takes issue with
three of the findings, claiming they are clearly erroneous. See
Br. of App. at 9-10. Defendant's contention is without merit.
She claims that the first finding contains an improper inference
because no direct testimony established that her speedy behavior
was due to stimulant use. See id. at 9. An inference, however,
is a "logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact not presented
by direct evidence . . .." Black's Law Dictionary 778 (6th ed.
1990)(emphasis added). Thus, the direct testimony about
defendant's behavior provided the basis for the trial court's
inferential finding that her motions ^appeared to be accelerated,
as if she were under the influence of a stimulant" (R. 27 at
addendum A)(emphasis added). Such a statement, falling well
short of a factual finding that defendant's behavior was actually
the result of stimulant use, does not demonstrate clear error.
Defendant also claims that two other findings were clearly
erroneous because they were "misleading." See Br. of App. at 10.
A plain language reading of the findings at issue, however,
reveals that only defendant's tortured interpretation of
straightforward wording can render those findings in any way
"misleading."
13

totality would prompt a reasonable person to inquire further,
this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Officer
Salis properly expanded the scope of the stop.
POINT TWO
OFFICER SALIS CONDUCTED A PROPER
PROTECTIVE FRISK WHERE DEFENDANT'S
BEHAVIOR WAS "VERY EVASIVE" AND
"VERY NERVOUS" AND WHERE THE
OFFICER OBSERVED THAT, DESPITE
BULKY CLOTHING, DEFENDANT HAD AN
OBVIOUS "BULGE" IN HER RIGHT FRONT
POCKET; THE PLAIN FEEL EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT JUSTIFIED
THE OFFICER'S SUBSEQUENT
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HER POCKET
Defendant first argues that the trial court incorrectly
characterized Officer Salis's conduct towards her as a frisk when
it was, in fact, an improper search, conducted without probable
cause or exigent circumstances.

See Br. of App. at 15-16.

Second, she argues that even if the officer's conduct consisted
only of a frisk, he was unjustified in using that technique
because he did not perceive any danger to his personal safety.
Id. at 16-17.

And, finally, she asserts that even if the frisk

was justified, it did not provide a legal basis for the officer
to remove the pipe from defendant's pocket.

Id. at 18. All

three contentions fail.
First, defendant's argument that she was searched rather
than frisked was not raised in the trial court and so may only be
reached pursuant to the plain error doctrine.

14

See Br. of App. at

1 n.l (relying on plain error to preserve issue for appeal).

To

prevail in a plain error analysis, defendant must demonstrate
that the trial court erred, that the error should have been
obvious, and that, absent the error, she had a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome.
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

In this case, defendant's argument fails

from the outset because the trial court did not err when it
characterized the officer's patdown of defendant as a frisk.

See

R. 2 8 at addendum A.
Specifically, defendant contends that "because the officer
required her to identify and produce the contents of her pockets
from the outset[,] . . . this conduct exceeds a frisk and
constitutes a search, requiring probable cause and exigent
circumstances as prerequisites."4
omitted).

Br. of App. at 15 (citations

In essence, defendant seems to be arguing that if an

officer reasonably believes he might be in danger, he can either
make inquiries to alleviate his fear or immediately frisk the
detainee.

He cannot, however, first ask questions and then

frisk, because the questions somehow convert the frisk to a
search.

Defendant offers no legal authority for this novel

4

Defendant cites to "R. 12 9 at 9" to support her statement
that "the officer required her to identify and produce the
contents of her pockets from the outset." "R. 129", however,
references the presentence investigation report. The state
presumes defendant is referring to the preliminary hearing
transcript, "R. 127."
15

proposition, nor does she offer any rational explanation for why
it should be so.
In this case, after the officer asked defendant to exit the
vehicle, he saw her grab two small bags and a pack of cigarettes
and then put her hands in her front pockets.

Responding to this

action, he reasonably asked what she had placed there (R. 127 at
8-9).
9).

Defendant denied placing anything in her pockets. (Id. at
Having just observed defendant's actions, the officer asked

her to remove the bag from her pocket (Id.).

Defendant then

pulled a bag out of her left front pants pocket.

The officer saw

that her right front pocket was still bulging (Id.).

See State

v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)(appearance of suspicious
bulge in the outer clothing may be a factor indicating that the
suspect might be armed).

When the officer asked defendant to

remove the other bag, she again denied having anything in the
bulging pocket and then turned and faced away from the officer.
As she did so, she put her hand in her right front pocket, pulled
out a small black purse, and dropped it on the ground.

After she

completed this movement, the officer testified, "she was still
being very evasive.

She did not want me to get close to that

pocket" (R. 127 at 9).
With defendant facing away from him so that he could not
tell if her pocket was still bulging, the officer explained that
he needed defendant to stand still.

16

She finally complied, and

Officer Salis "padded down [sic] the exterior of that pocket"
(Id.).

He testified that he did so primarily to "make sure there

was no weapons. . ." (Id. at 20). Under these circumstances,
where her pocket was bulging and where the officer carefully
confined the scope of his patdown to a minimal intrusion designed
to discover the contents only of one suspicious pocket, the trial
court correctly characterized his action as a frisk rather than a
search.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (characterizing ambit of frisk

as "limited in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to
discover . . .[weapons] for the assault of the police officer");
State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986)(upholding patdown
limited to defendant's belt line).
Second, as to the propriety of the frisk under the
circumstances here, the trial court ruled, "Even though defendant
had not been hostile, her movements indicated possible
concealment of a weapon.

An officer may frisk for safety reasons

whenever there is a reasonable basis for concern, not just when
it is more likely than not that a weapon is concealed" (R. 2 8 at
addendum A).

Where defendant had already lied to the officer

twice about the contents of her pockets and where she continued
to act evasively after removing one object from her right front
pocket, the trial court's ruling on the legality of the frisk is
correct.
Section 77-7-16 of the Utah Code authorizes a police officer
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to frisk a person for dangerous weapons if the police officer
"reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger."

This

section must be applied in compliance with the constitutional
mandates of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

State v. Rovbal,

716 P.2d at 292; see State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah
1985).

That is, to obviate the need for a search warrant, an

officer must have a reasonable belief that the person he is
frisking may be armed and dangerous.

Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 21;

Rovbal, 716 P.2d at 292. The officer need not be in actual fear
of harm nor need he be completely certain that the individual is
armed.

But an officer "must be able to point to 'specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'"

State v.

White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1993)(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
21); accord State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1993).
Fundamentally, "the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger."

Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 27.

Here, the officer testified specifically about what prompted
him to frisk defendant:
Well, she had removed two bags from the
vehicle before exiting the vehicle. As she
was walking towards me, she had both hands in
her pockets. She was wearing two layers of
clothes. She was wearing a large pair of
camouflage pants over other clothing. She,
also, had a large sweater on. And as she's
walking towards me, after she removes her
18

hands from her pockets, I could see both of
her pockets are bulging, and she's also very
nervous and very evasive, doesn't want to
come into contact with me.
(R. 127 at 19-20) . Faced with this situation, the officer wanted
"to first make sure there was no weapons" (Id. at 20).

Because,

based on the articulated facts, the officer reasonably believed
defendant might possess a weapon, he was justified in quickly
frisking the single suspicious pocket to ensure his own safety.
See State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 1 15, 37 P.3d 270
(identifying that "facts and circumstances unique to the . . .
factual context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect may be armed," thus warranting a frisk).
When the officer conducted the frisk, however, he did not
discover a weapon.

Rather, he felt the unmistakable contour of a

pipe in defendant's pocket.

Defendant asserts that the officer's

identification of this non-weapons contraband did not justify his
subsequent action of reaching into defendant's pocket and
removing the pipe.5
Defendant's argument fails.

The most direct justification

for retrieving the drug paraphernalia from defendant's pocket is
the plain feel doctrine, a corollary of the plain view exception

5

The trial court ruled that the evidence so seized was
admissible, stating that "[o]nce [the officer] frisked defendant,
the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was
carrying contraband, and the exigent circumstances are obvious
here" (R. 2 8 at addendum A ) .
19

to the warrant requirement.
366 (1993).

See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.

Pursuant to the plain feel doctrine, "an object felt

during an authorized patdown search may be seized without a
warrant if the item's incriminating character is immediately
apparent, i.e., if the officer develops probable cause to believe
that the item felt is contraband before going beyond the
legitimate scope of the patdown search."

People v. Champion, 549

N.W.2d 849, 856 (Mich. 1996)(adopting plain feel exception to
warrant requirement); accord State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160 (Wash.
1994)(same).

Probable cause that the pipe was associated with

criminal activity requires only that the officer reasonably
believe that the pipe "may be contraband. . . or useful as
evidence of crime; it does not demand any showing that such
belief be correct."

State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah

App. 1998)(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742
(1983)(plurality opinion)).
The facts of this case fall squarely within the plain feel
exception.

Officer Salis testified, "At that point I was padding

[sic] down the exterior of that right front pocket.

And while

doing so, I felt what I believed was a pipe in that right front
pocket" (R. 127 at 9). At this juncture, the officer reasonably
believed that the pipe could be evidence of crime because he knew
defendant had already lied to him twice about the contents of her
pockets, because he thought the green particles inside the cup
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were marijuana, and because defendant continued to behave
throughout the encounter in an unusually nervous and evasive
manner.

Accordingly, when the officer felt what he immediately

believed to be a pipe, he had developed the necessary probable
cause to reach in and remove the contraband.

See Minnesota v.

Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76.
Where Officer Sails properly seized the pipe that was
subject to his plain feel and, under the totality of the
circumstances, was clearly incriminating, this Court should
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for possession or use of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a second degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f(y

day of July, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Case No.

ROBIN M. LAFOND
Defendant,

0117-56

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant contends that she was stopped on pretextual
grounds, but concedes that this court lacks authority to overrule
precedent eliminating a pretextual stop as a basis for
suppressing evidence.

Defendant was stopped for driving 79 miles

per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone, and for having an unlighted
license plate.
The critical issue for decision is whether the officer had a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified
expanding the scope and length of the original stop, and whether
the search of defendant's pocket was justified by probable cause
and exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant
requirement.

1

The State argues that expansion of the original stop was
justified because:
1.

Defendant's motions appeared to be accelerated, as if
she were under the influence of a stimulant.

2.

Defendant kept looking at the seat and the floor.

3.

Defendant picked up a brown leather purse and put it
between her legs as if to conceaJ it.

4.

There was a Crown Royal bag on the seat with something
in it.

5.

There were green particles in the ashtray that the
officer thought might be marijuana.

6.

Defendant acknowledged that someone might have used
marijuana in her vehicle.

7.

Once asked to step out of the vehicle, defendant
grabbed two bags and put her hands in her pockets,
causing the officer to believe she might have hidden
something in her pockets.

Her pockets were bulging.

The Court agrees with the State that, to this point, the
officer had a reasonable basis for suspecting that something was
amiss, sufficient to justify the officer's further inquiry.
Since the officer does not claim that the green particles
actually were marijuana, only that he thought they could be, and

2

because human sight is less subject to suggestion than human
smell, the rule requiring that marijuana actually be found does
not apply.

An officer who stops a vehicle always has the right

to require the occupant to step out of the vehicle.
Defendant also claims that the pat down was an improper
frisk.

The court disagrees.

Even though defendant had not been

hostile, her movements indicated possible concealment of a
weapon.

An officer may frisk for safety reasons whenever there

is a reasonable basis for concern, not just when it is more
likely than not that a weapon is concealed.

Once he frisked

defendant, the officer had probable cause to believe that
defendant was carrying contraband, and the exigent circumstances
are obvious here.
The Motion to Suppress is denied.

Defendant is ordered to

appear for trial setting on June 5, 2001, at 9:30 a.m.

lis /^LAAlA,
/JAAXA day of May, 2001
Dated this

R. Anderson,/District Judge
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